Abstract. We propose a practical digital signature scheme based on the elliptic curve modulo n , where n = p 2 q such that p and q are large secret primes. The signature generation speed of our scheme is more than 10 times faster than that of the RSA scheme. Moreover, a pre-processing technique can significan t.ly increase the signature generation speed.
Introduction
T h e use oC Digital signatures is being increasingly demanded to ensure the integrity and authenticity of digital messages and documents. Applications include electronic mail, office automation, and electronic funds transfer.
Many digital signature schemes have been developed since DiEe and Hellman's seminal paper on public key cryptosystems [DH] was presented in 1976. Among these schemes, the RSA scheme [RS.4] appears to be very promising from the practical viewpoint. However, the RSX scheme has the disadvantage of low processing speed, and is somewhat insecure against low multiplier attacks [Ha] and attacks using the hornomorphic property [EH] . Although effective countermeasures are known against these attacks, the existence of these attacks may imply some implicit weaknesses in the RSA scheme.
The security of the ItSA scheme can be increased with the scheme based on an elliptic curve over a ring 2 , [KMOV] . This variant (the KMOV scheme) seems to be more secure than the original RSA scheme against some attacks such as low multiplier attacks, although it is less efficient.
In this paper, we propose a new digital signature scheme based on an elliptic curve over a ring Z , , that is more efficient than the RSA scheme as well as the KMOV scheme. We construct the new scheme on an elliptic curve over a ring using the idea of Okamoto's scheme [Ok] . The new scheme s e e m to be more secure than Okamoto's scheme against low degree attacks (or lattice attacks) and seems t,o be more secure than the RSA scheme against the homomorphic attacks. That is, our scheme with parameter k = 2, the double version, seems t o be secure, while Okamoto's scheme with k = 2, the quadratic version, has been broken [BD, VGT] . Our scheme has no homomorphic property since the relationship between a message and its signature is randomized (or our signature is verified by an inequality not by an equation), so no homomorphic attack seems to apply t o our scheme. This implies a possibility that our scheme may still be 55 secure even if security weaknesses in Okamoto's or RSA scheme are found in the future. The pre-processing technique (off-line processing) is possible with our scheme, as is true for Okamoto's scheme and DSA proposed by NIST as DSS (the Digital Signature Standard) [NIST] . This dramatically increases the signature generation (on-line processing) speed of our scheme. Thus, signature generation with our scheme is effectively instantaneous even if implemented on a smart card.
Notations
2, denotes the set of numbers between 0 and n -1, and 2: denotes the set of numbers between 0 and n -I which are relatively prime to n. denotes the least integer which is larger than or equal to M. 2 y (mod n ) denotes that n divides z -y. f(z) mod n denotes an integer such that n divides f(x) -(f(x) mod n ) and f ( x ) mod n E 2,. z / y mod R denotes an integer such that n divides z -y(z/y mod n) and z / y mod R E 2,. 1x1 denotes [log, -U] + 1, or the bit size of X.
Elliptic Curves over a Field and a Ring
Assume that I< is the finite prime field G F ( p ) with p # 2 , 3. An elliptic curve over K (in affine coordinates), denoted by C,, is the set of all solutions called the point at infinity. Here, the group law operation [Kol] (usually we call it the addition, and use the notation +) is defined over the points on c,, P(.~,YI),Q(Q,Yz), and R ( z~, Y~) as follows:
Let p and p be primes and n = p 2 q . Consider an elliptic curve modulo n ; cn. a positive integer n = p'q.
Signature generation:
* Pick a random number t E Z;q.
where h is a one-way hash function (h(rn) E 2, for any positive integer m ) , k is an integer (4 5 k). 
Mathematical Preparations
The Taylor series expansion and the generalized Taylor series expansion for a multi-variable function are essential to prove the correctness of our schemes.
Proposition 1. (The Taylor expansion)
When function f is a one-variable infinitely differen tiable function,
where a is not a singular point, 2 is less than the convergence radii, and f(') denotes I-th derived function of j . , a * ) of ( Z l & +. . . + r t g -> ' f ( z 1 , 2 2 , . . . , Z t ) .
5.2
In this section, we show an extension of Okamoto's scheme, in which a rational function f is used in place of the polynomial function.
Extension Using a Rational Function

Procedures
Keys:
large prime numbers p , q ( p > q ) .
a raiional function f.
Signature generation:
o The signature s of a message rn is computed by an originator as follows:
* Pick a random number i E Z i q . If one of the following cases occurs, pick another random number 1 E Z ; q :
Here, f is a rational function) or there exist polynomial functions, u and b, satisfying f = a/b. f' is the derived function o f f , or f'(2) = 9. Note that this check is not necessary in practice, since these cases occur with negligible probability.
* Compute s such that u = w / f ' ( t ) mod p ,
Here, h is a one-way hash function ( h ( m ) E 2, for any positive integer m). Functions h and f can be fixed in the system. 
for a n y t E 2, and t-tupq E 2,. From the definition of f(z), f(t+upp) mod R = f ( t + upq) mod n. Therefore, f ( t + u p q ) mod n = f ( t ) + f(l)(t)upq mod n.
Furthermore from the equation u! = ft1)(t)u rnod p , we have f ( t + upq) mod n = f ( t ) + wpq mod n.
On the other hand, from the definition w = -'(t)modn) 1, we obtain 1 ( ' P i
) +TI where 0 5 y < pq. Therefore we have the following equation:
5.3
In this section, we present another extension of Okamoto's scheme, in which a multi-variable rational function f takes the place of the single-var\iable function.
Procedures c
Let f j ( j = 1, , . . , J) be an I-variable rational function and f denote ( f i , . . . , f~) .
Let z = (zlJ .. . , z J )~ g = ( g l J . . . , y j ) , where z i E 2, ( i = 1 ,... ,Z)J and yj E 2, ( j = 1,. . . , J). We writ= f (~) 85 yj = fj(X1,. . . , ZI) (i = I,. . . , J).
In this subsection, we show a signature scheme that uses f only once. However, by repeating the following procedure, we can easily construct a signature scheme based on a more complicated multi-variable rational function. In the next section, we will show an example in which the basic procedure is repeab edly executed.
Extension Using a Multi-Variable Function
For explanation simplicity, we suppose that I = J . m, which is generated through the above-described procedure. Then,
This theorem can be proven in a manner similar to Theorem 3, using the generalized Taylor expansion.
5.4
This section introduces our new scheme based on an elliptic curve over 2,. The correctness of the scheme is given as a combined specific example of two previous extensions of Okamoto's scheme; the new scheme is the two-uanable rational function version.
A New scheme Based on Elliptic Curve over 2,
5.4.1
We consider an elliptic curve C,:
Elliptic Curve and Some Definitions y2 = z3 + ax + b over 2,1.
As described in Section 3, the addition operation is defined over the points on executed by the addition formula, and that T is not necessary to be on C,.) Note that this check is not necessary in practice, since these cases occur with negligible probability.
where, h is a one-way hash functionjm,, my E Zn). Integer k and functions h can be fixed in the system. Note that the parameter a in the public key can be fixed in the system. Therefore the real public key for each user is considered t o be an only n.
* Note that kT over 2, and D(T,k)-' can be computed as preprocessing works since they are independent of a message m.
Algorithm D
Input: T ! k
Output: 2 x 2 matrix D(T,k), whose element is in 2;.
Step 1: Set A = ( A l , A2) such that
Set 1 +--1 and t t 0.
The bit expression of k is " 6~6~-l
. . 61 ."
(The initial setting for B = ( I 3 1 Bz) is not necessary, since the value of B is set in Step 2.)
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Step 2:
Step 3:
If br = 1 and t = 0 , then B t A and t -1.
If bl = 1 and t = 1, then B + G ( A , B ) .
If 1 = L , then output B2 as D(T,k).
Otherwise 1 -1 + 1, and A + F ( A ) . 
Return t o Step
Security Consideration
The security of our scheme depends on the difficulty of factoring n = p 2 q . Although it has not been proven that our scheme is as secure as factoring, our scheme s e e m to be more secure than Okamoto's scheme, against which no attack is known SO far when its degree is greater than three. The quadratic version of Okamoto's scheme was broken by Brickell et.al. [BD] , and this attack was However, this approximation technique does not appear applicable to our scheme even if it is the double version (k = a), since the rational function mod n is essentially used in our scheme. Although it is not clear that factoring n = p2q is as hard as factoring n = p q , no attack has been reported so far, that is specifically effective for a number with the square of a prime.
7 Performance
We have estimated the amount of work needed to generate a signature with our scheme and compare it with that of the RSA scheme. We assume that n(= p'q)
is 96 bytes and k = 2 for our scheme, and n'(= p'q') is 64 bytes for RSA.
Signature generation with the new scheme requires 4 modulo-n multiplications, 1 modulo-n division, 17 modulo-p multiplications, and 1 modulo-p division.
So, in total, it is almost equivalent to (4 + 17/9) + (1 + 1/9)c modulo-n multiplications, which is less than (6 + 1 . 2~) modulo-n multiplications. Here, c is the ratio of the amount of work for modulo-n division to that for modulo-n multiplication, and is considered to be less than 10 from our implementation data based on algorithm L (p.329) in [Kn] . The RSA scheme requires 750 modub-n' multiplications.
As the computational complexity of one modulo-n multiplication is almost equivalent to that of 2.25 (= 1.52) modulo-n' multiplications, signature generation with our scheme is considered to require less than 40 modulo-n' multiplications.
The signature generation speed of our new scheme is more than 10 times faster than that of the M A scheme. If the Chinese Remainder Theorem technique is applied to the RSA scheme, the amount of work is theoretically reduced by 75%, while the work of our scheme is reduced by about .50%. In addition, the m-ary exponentiation and Montgomery arithmetic techniques can reduce the amount of work needed by the RSA scheme, however, they can also applied to our scheme. Therefore our new scheme is still at least several times faster than the RSA scheme. Moreover, the pre-processing technique (off-line processing) is possible with our scheme, as is true for Okamoto's scheme [FOM] and DSA. In the preprocessing phase, some computations that do not depend on the message are executed. This dramatically increases the signature generation (on-line processing) speed of our scheme. Thus, signat,ure generation with our scheme is effectively instantaneous even if implemented on a smart card? since the amount of work needed for signature generation is less than one modulo--n multiplication.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new practical digital signature scheme based on elliptic curves over a ring. To construct this scheme, we introduced two extensions of Okamoto's scheme. The signature generation speed of o u r scheme is m o r e than 10 times faster than that of the RSA scheme. Moreover, a pre-processing technique can significantly increase the signature generation speed.
